"[T]here are two open disputes regarding the standard. First, we have not fully addressed whether the skilled searcher inquiry poses a question of law, reviewable de novo, or a question of fact, reviewable for clear error. We do not opine on this issue here because we conclude that the district court’s error regarding the Landon IP evidence is apparent under either standard of review. Separately, we have not yet had the opportunity to take a conclusive stance on what “discover[y]” within the skilled searcher inquiry entails . . . The district court purported to rely on classification searches based on the Board’s application of § 315(e)(1) estoppel in the ’136 IPR, which primarily looked to classification searches in identifying the reasonable discoverability of Wörn. The district court also found that classification searching satisfied the standard of reasonableness set forth in certain district court cases to consider the issue of IPR estoppel . . . The district court’s conclusion regarding Kotkin was error. First, as noted above, the Board in the ’136 IPR did not consider mere classification searches, without more, to be the endpoint of its analysis; rather, it went on to consider that these classifications would be manually searched, or that keyword searching could have been used to narrow the classification search results down further to an amount capable of manual review. Similarly, we conclude that the Clearlamp standard relied upon by the district court does not go far enough when an unreviewably large number of references are returned by a skilled searcher’s diligent search. We do not hold that manual review of search results will in all instances be necessary to establish discovery. We also do not go so far as to endorse Valve’s vision of the discoverability standard, though we note the normative force of Valve’s argument that thousands of sources, not further narrowed in any way, likely cannot be considered discovered for estoppel purposes under § 315(e)(2). We hold only that something more is required for estoppel when a classification search alone returns an unreviewable number of search results—a demand not met here.." (emphasis added)

"inserting an introducer through a pedicle of the vertebral body such that an opening at a distal tip of the introducer reaches a cancellous portion of the vertebral body"

". . . that the OptaBlate BVN’s “access cannula” corresponded to the claimed “introducer.” Stryker argued that it did not induce infringement of that limitation because Stryker did not instruct physicians to place the access cannula so that it “reaches” the cancellous portion of the bone . . . The district court concluded that the “reaches” limitation required that the distal tip of the introducer “touch[] or extend[] to” the cancellous portion of the vertebral body and that the evidence did not sufficiently demonstrate that Stryker instructed physicians using its device to extend the access cannula to reach the cancellous bone."

"[A] slide show presented internally to sales personnel instructs “to enter just inside the vertebral body past posterior wall,” but it is again unclear whether this is referring to the access cannula or the tip of the stylet . . . The expert declarations supplied by the parties present conflicting views as to how to interpret these documents. The district court reasonably considered evidence that Stryker instructed that the “stylet tip should barely—if at all—enter the vertebral body,” i.e., the cancellous bone, J.A. 17 (emphasis omitted), and concluded that the slides’ reference to “[f]inal position should be just inside the vertebral body” could be referring to the final position of the stylet tip rather than the tip of the access cannula . . . Boston Scientific appears to contend that by instructing a physician to place the access cannula inside the wall of the vertebral body, Stryker instructs placing the tip of the access cannula through the wall and inside the vertebral body rather than literally inside the wall itself, which is made of cortical bone. As the district court reasonably concluded, this could be read as instructing physicians to place the access cannula such that it reaches the cortical wall rather than the cancellous portion . . . Boston Scientific relies on an internal Stryker document that describes the access cannula as being “placed within the cancellous bone of the spine” . . . While this may well support Boston Scientific’s position, it cannot carry Boston Scientific’s burden to show no substantial question of infringement exists, as it is an internal document, there is no contention that it was given to users of the OptaBlate BVN, and Boston Scientific has not proven what (if any) impact this or other internal materials have on what Stryker conveys to others."

"Medmix presents two main arguments on appeal. The principal argument is that the Board improperly construed the term “at least two ramps” to not require an “inclined plane” . . . Separately, medmix asserts that the Board’s motivation-to-combine findings were not supported by substantial evidence."

generating a new password for said first secure computer network based at least upon the token and a passcode, wherein the token is not known to the user and wherein the passcode is known to the user;

setting a password associated with the user to be the new password

"Dynapass argues the district court erred in construing “receiving the password” in claim 12 to preclude separate receipt of the “passcode” and “token” components of the password . . . While the written description discloses multiple embodiments for authenticating a user, the patentee’s chosen claim language unambiguously does not extend to the al- ternative embodiment where the passcode and token are received separately . . . Claim 1 recites (1) “generating a new password . . . based at least upon the token and a passcode;” (2) “setting a pass- word . . . to be the new password;” and then (3) “receiving the password from the user . . . .” This language requires generating a password from the passcode and token before receiving the password. Receiving the passcode and token separately would not constitute “receiving the password” since the individual passcode and token components are not the claimed “password.”

...

The written description supports this construction. In the alternative embodiment, the written description never refers to separate reception of the passcode and token as receiving the password. ’658 patent at 4:59–61 (“In an al- ternative embodiment, the passcode 154 and the token 156 are submitted separately.”). The written description also repeatedly juxtaposes the password with the passcode and token components . . . We see no error in the district court’s construction of “receiving the password” to preclude separate reception of the passcode and token."

"The Board’s finding “that one device in a ‘better position’ than the other devices [to handle a subsequent user query] then exits its low power mode and ‘wakes up’ so it can respond to any subsequent user query” is unsupported by substantial evidence because it assumes a causal relationship between two steps Rosenberger discloses as independent alternatives . . . Sonos argues we may nevertheless affirm under its alternative theory that Rosenberger anticipates the challenged claims because Rosenberger’s devices remain in a low power mode other than Rosenberger’s self-described, low power “listening” mode during coordination . . . It is undisputed, however, that the Board made no fact findings regarding this alternative “low power mode” theory in its FWDs . . . We decline to make fact findings regarding this alternative theory in the first instance and leave this issue for the Board to consider on remand."