"Linfo and Trustpilot’s Agreement triggers a jurisdictional inquiry for this court because, if the Agreement ended the controversy between the parties, we must dismiss this case as moot . . . Section 2.1 of the Agreement grants Trustpilot a “worldwide and irrevocable license” to “make . . . use, offer for sale, [and] sell” products or services covered by the ’428 patent “[s]ubject to [Trustpilot’s] payment of the Settlement Fee” . . . The Agreement also notes that if the Southern District of New York lawsuit “resumes in any manner, or the Federal Circuit . . . remands [this] case to the District Court, [Linfo] . . . shall file a Stipulated Dismissal with Prejudice . . . Altogether, the Agreement demonstrates that Trustpilot no longer has a stake in the outcome of this litigation"

. . . wherein said mobile computing device software comprises executable program code configured to facilitate annotation of a portion of said synchronization index responsive to user input received by the mobile computing device . . .

. . . said mobile computing device software comprises executable program code configured to synchronously play said associated multimedia with said synchronization index other than as part of a web page."

"Whether the non-function term (here, “executable program code”) identifies sufficient structure has two aspects that are of particular importance for the present case. First: We have often asked whether the non-function term would be understood by relevant artisans to name something identified by structural (not just functional) properties at all (a necessary predicate to being a structure that suffices for the claimed function(s)) . . . Second: Not just extra-patent usage in the field on its own, but, consistent with the importance of context to claim construction generally, the claim language may suffice to make clear whether certain claim words name sufficient structure in the understanding of the relevant artisan." . . .

. . . The function-operation distinction warrants particular attention in the software context, which is at issue here, because a non-functional term referring to code “is partly defined by its function . . .

. . . On remand, the focus of the § 112(f) analysis should be on whether the disputed limitations, read in full and in context, recite enough structure to perform the claimed functions . . .

. . . The claim language that here requires the annotation, synchronous-play, and other functions to be carried out by the same “software” communicates that the code referred to must be capable of being implemented with code that performs the other claimed functions . . . The parties’ arguments to date have not been focused on whether the claims reveal structure for those precise functions . . .

. . . more attention must be paid to whether the “executable program code” limitations, for the functions stated above, were generally known in the art at the time of the invention as names for known code. ”

"Based principally on the guidance provided by the specification, we find Otsuka’s proposed claim construction more persuasive than the construction offered by Hetero. We construe the terms “dextromethorphan” and “quinidine” in the ’282 patent, including their use in the weightto-weight ratio of claim 1, to refer to the form in which those compounds are administered. Applying that construction, we hold that the district court did not err in finding that Otsuka was likely to succeed in proving that Hetero infringed the ’282 patent."

"While at first blush it is appealing to construe the terms “dextromethorphan” and “quinidine” to refer only to the free base forms of those compounds, a close analysis of the claims and specification of the ’282 patent leads us to construe those terms as referring to the compounds whether in free base or salt form."

"The majority’s construction, which calculates the weight-to-weight ratio either using the weight of the active moiety (when administered in the pure “free base” form) or the total weight of a salt compound (when administered in the salt form), is inconsistent with the objective of the invention and is unsupported by the specification and prosecution history . . . The purpose of the invention claimed in the ’282 patent is thus to decrease the blood level of quinidine while maintaining a therapeutically effective blood level of dextromethorphan in a patient that is receiving this treatment . . . Nothing in the intrinsic record indicates that administering quinidine or dextromethorphan in the form of a salt (as opposed to the free base form) has any therapeutic effect related to the efficacy of the combination or that it affects the blood levels of dextromethorphan and quinidine . . . Because, under the correct claim construction, Hetero has raised a substantial question of noninfringement, I would reverse the preliminary injunction."

"The district court granted Pfizer’s motion, concluding that the “C2” in —NHC(O)—C2-C12-alkyl of the ’048 provisional was not an obvious typographical error that it had the power to correct, and therefore the change from — NHC(O)—C2-C12-alkyl in the ’048 provisional to — NHC(O)—C1-C12-alkyl in the ’953 patent impermissibly broadened the scope of the patent such that the ’953 patent was not entitled to priority from the ’048 provisional . . . Here . . . the dispute is whether there is adequate written description support in the ’048 provisional’s disclosure of —NHC(O)— C2-C12-alkyl for the ’953 patent’s disclosure of —NHC(O)— C1-alkyl. That is, whether “2” provides adequate written description support for “1” . . . We conclude that the ’048 provisional does not convey to a skilled artisan that the inventors possessed — NHC(O)—C1-alkyl at the time of the ’048 provisional’s filing date. The ’048 provisional and the ’953 patent recite two different ranges of chemical moieties. The former recites —NHC(O)—C2-C12-alkyl and the latter recites — NHC(O)—C1-C12-alkyl. C2 is simply different from C1, and the ’048 provisional’s disclosure of a range of C2 to C12 provides no support for the ’953 patent’s disclosure of C1 because the ’048 application explicitly includes an alkyl group with two to twelve carbon atoms (i.e., —NHC(O)—C2-C12- alkyl), and notably does not include an alkyl group with one carbon atom (i.e., —NHC(O)—C1-alkyl) . . . , “[e]ntitlement to a filing date . . . extends only to that which is disclosed,” Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1571–72, and —NHC(O)—C1-alkyl was simply not disclosed in the ’048 provisional."

"[T]here are two open disputes regarding the standard. First, we have not fully addressed whether the skilled searcher inquiry poses a question of law, reviewable de novo, or a question of fact, reviewable for clear error. We do not opine on this issue here because we conclude that the district court’s error regarding the Landon IP evidence is apparent under either standard of review. Separately, we have not yet had the opportunity to take a conclusive stance on what “discover[y]” within the skilled searcher inquiry entails . . . The district court purported to rely on classification searches based on the Board’s application of § 315(e)(1) estoppel in the ’136 IPR, which primarily looked to classification searches in identifying the reasonable discoverability of Wörn. The district court also found that classification searching satisfied the standard of reasonableness set forth in certain district court cases to consider the issue of IPR estoppel . . . The district court’s conclusion regarding Kotkin was error. First, as noted above, the Board in the ’136 IPR did not consider mere classification searches, without more, to be the endpoint of its analysis; rather, it went on to consider that these classifications would be manually searched, or that keyword searching could have been used to narrow the classification search results down further to an amount capable of manual review. Similarly, we conclude that the Clearlamp standard relied upon by the district court does not go far enough when an unreviewably large number of references are returned by a skilled searcher’s diligent search. We do not hold that manual review of search results will in all instances be necessary to establish discovery. We also do not go so far as to endorse Valve’s vision of the discoverability standard, though we note the normative force of Valve’s argument that thousands of sources, not further narrowed in any way, likely cannot be considered discovered for estoppel purposes under § 315(e)(2). We hold only that something more is required for estoppel when a classification search alone returns an unreviewable number of search results—a demand not met here.." (emphasis added)