Applicant understands and agrees to Samsung Semiconductor, Inc.’s terms of sale (attached), to pay service charges assessed (comma where are you?) and to pay reasonable attorneys [sic] fees in the event of default." (snark added)

"Finelite contends, primarily using grammar principles, that the disputed statement incorporated only two aspects of the terms of sale on pages 4 and 5. Under its view, it breaks the sentence into two parts. It interprets the first part—“Applicant understands and agrees to Samsung Semiconductor, Inc.’s terms of sale (attached)”—as the main clause . . . It then contends that the second half—“to pay service charges assessed and to pay reasonable attorneys [sic] fees in the event of default”—is a limitation on the main clause and specifically limits the incorporation of the “terms of sale” to only those sections on pages 4 and 5 relating to “service charges” and “attorneys [sic] fees.” Id. This is an incorrect reading of the 2012 Agreement . . . The disputed statement is best read as a list or series of obligations, not a grant followed by limitations. Notwithstanding the omission of the Oxford comma . . . the comma placement and use of “and” in the disputed statement reflect a series in which Finelite agreed to multiple items, including all “terms of sale” . . . [Furthermore] Finelite’s interpretation must also be rejected because it would impermissibly render substantial portions of the 2012 Agreement superfluous."

"The district court found no literal infringement, concluding, as most relevant here, that the claim term “a pH of 13 or higher” refers to a pH measured at a temperature standard in the field. The district court further ruled that Actelion was barred from asserting, and had not proved, infringement by an equivalent. "

"Actelion argues that the district court’s standard-temperature construction of the claim phrase “formed from a bulk solution having a pH of 13 or higher” is incorrect . . . The claim language, standing alone, does not resolve the question of the proper interpretation of “a pH of 13 or higher” . . . The specification favors the district court’s construction over Actelion’s. The specification never states outright the conditions of any of the (many) pH measurements reported in its examples . . . The contrary evidence marshalled by Actelion does not leave us with a definite and firm conviction that the district court made a mistake . . . evidence does not actually contradict the district court’s finding—that a statement of a pH value in the art is understood to refer to standard-temperature measurements “unless otherwise specified,” thus recognizing that a particular statement might specify otherwise . . . Actelion’s cited evidence merely shows instances of such specification; none of it says that a pH value without identification of a temperature should be assumed to mean anything other than a pH measured at standard temperature."

"We thus agree with the district court that Actelion failed to show that the claim amendment is only tangential to the differences between the alleged equivalent and the literal claim scope, and we conclude that Actelion is estopped from asserting the doctrine of equivalents here . . . The disclosure-dedication rule independently bars Actelion’s theory of infringement by an equivalent"

"Relying on testimony from Metrom’s CEO, the Board found that the AURA CAS product had unclaimed “important features or components,” including “key machine function monitoring and remote data reporting,” that were “not insignificant.” J.A. 27–28 (emphasis in original)."

"The dissent argues that the petitioners did not argue before the Board that “any pulses whose timing is used for calculating separation distance (even when the signals encode nothing, much less separation distance) constitute ‘data representing the separation distance’ as a matter of claim construction” . . . But the issue was raised, even though it was not designated as a matter of claim construction. The petitioners elaborated in their reply on the impulse radio signal theory articulated in the petition, which clearly argued that the “data representing the separation distance” is the data used in the time-of-flight technique. The reply stated “[t]he only way distance information is displayed [in Grisham] is if data representing the separation distance is communicated over the air. . . . The exact details about how this separation distance is determined from the impulse radio signal (via the time of flight technique) was described with respect to [17G] (where Mr. Andrews refers back to [1J]).” . . . Faulting petitioners for not raising claim construction seems unfair because it was Metrom in its sur-reply and the Board in its final written decision that adopted the implied and incorrect claim construction."

"Siemens did not present or develop this construction in challenging the Board’s ruling on claims 17–20 in this court; indeed, it did not present a claim-construction argument at all, but only an argument that the Board misread the prior-art reference, Grisham . . . The Board found that Grisham does not teach Claim 17 for a simple reason . . . What is missing in Grisham, the Board ruled, is what element 17C requires—that the first vehicle’s “communications antenna” is “operable to send and receive data representing the separation distance over the air” (17C (emphasis added)) . . . when Siemens and its expert asserted that Figure 22 teaches element 17C, they never stated that the first four steps (transmission and receipt of impulse radio signals) themselves constituted the over-the-air transmission and receipt of data representing the separation distance simply because the signals’ timing is used to calculate a distance (by a time-of-flight method that does not rely on any encoding of information in the signals at all). That simple point is what Siemens would have made had it been advancing the claim construction adopted by the court today. It did not do so. Instead, for its contention that Grisham disclosed 17C, Siemens relied, at the petition stage and also at the reply stage, on certain arguments keyed to the reference in the last step to “distance” (2212, referring to display of “direction, speed, and distance”). That reliance was wholly unnecessary if bare use of the timing of pulse signals for a distance calculation is enough as a matter of claim construction."

"In Dragon . . . [t]he accused infringer then moved for attorney fees incurred during the IPR proceeding, arguing that the IPR was “part and parcel” of the district court litigation such that attorney fees and costs were recoverable under § 285 . . . We rejected that argument, stating that the accused infringer strategically pursued the IPR proceeding in lieu of litigating invalidity before the district court. Id. In doing so, we highlighted the voluntary nature of the IPR proceeding."

"Here, there is no dispute that (1) Bissell’s source code was produced in discovery, (2) Bissell’s expert relied on his review of the source code to conclude that Bissell’s domestic industry products satisfied the disabled battery limitation, (3) experts in this field would reasonably rely on source code to understand the operation of the domestic industry products, and (4) Tineco never provided expert opinions or theories contrary to Dr. Sorensen’s opinions on the issue. Indeed, in its prehearing brief, Tineco did not even assert that Bissell’s domestic industry products did not practice the disabled battery limitation . . . Under the circumstances presented in this case, we hold that an expert can rely on source code without a party introducing that source code into the evidentiary record at trial."