"VDPP implicitly agreed not to amend its complaint in exchange for Volkswagen’s consent to an extension of time for VDPP to respond to Volkswagen’s motion to dismiss . . . After securing the extension, VDPP presented its proposed amended complaint to the district court anyway with no justification . . . This alone would have provided a basis for the court’s denial of leave to amend. Setting this aside, the court also correctly rejected VDPP’s proposed amended complaint as futile because it too was subject to dismissal . . . VDPP sought pre-suit damages, VDPP had a burden to plead compliance with the notice provision of 35 U.S.C. § 287(a), including compliance by VDPP’s licensees . . . VDPP’s proposed amended complaint failed to meet its burden of showing compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 287."

"[T]he court reasonably determined that “[m]any of the positions VDPP took were frivolous and objectively unreasonable,” including seeking future damages and an injunction on an expired patent, seeking past damages despite an inability to allege patent marking, failing to disclose relevant settlement agreements, and prolonging litigation with false statements about the settlement agreements."

"Mr. Ramey filed notices of appeal on August 7, 2024 and August 13, 2024 . . . Both notices list only “Plaintiff VDPP, LLC” as an appellant and thus fail to specify Mr. Ramey as a party taking the appeal . . . The notices, therefore, give no indication that Mr. Ramey intended to be an appellant; rather, Mr. Ramey’s name serves only to identify a specific order that his client VDPP was appealing. Because this order held both VDPP and Mr. Ramey jointly and severally liable for Volkswagen’s attorney fees . . . it was not clear that Mr. Ramey was also appealing the order on his own behalf rather than merely representing his client . . . Having concluded that Mr. Ramey failed to timely appeal the district court’s sanctions order on his own behalf and that VDPP lacks standing to contest the sanctions for him, we dismiss this portion of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction."

". . . whereby said hydraulic fluid acts substantially as a solid with said thickness being substantially constant while said actuator assembly is activated . . ." (emphasis added)

"The Board reasoned that because membrane 6 is flexible, it will flex during actuation. Thus, in the Board’s view, Bosch failed to prove that Klügl satisfies limitation 1(e)’s requirement that the hydraulic fluid “acts substantially as a solid with said thickness being substantially constant.”"

"According to Bosch, “stroke translation” refers to a change in the amount of movement from the actuator to the opening of the valve, such that if there is “no stroke translation” (as in Klügl’s Figure 1) the hydraulic fluid is required to achieve a constant thickness . . . Yet the only evidence Bosch produced in support of its definition of stroke translation was the declaration of its expert, Dr. Quinlan . . . which the Board found was “undermined by incomplete and contradictory opinions.”"

"We see no error in the Board’s addressing the question of reasonable pertinence, and the requirements of the APA were satisfied for three independent reasons . . . the reasonably pertinent prong overlaps with the field-of-endeavor prong in this case, and the same evidence was germane to both prongs . . . There is also no requirement for a petitioner’s analogous-art theory to be made expressly; such a theory may be implicit in the petition"

"[T]hough the specification identifies certain drawbacks to the overuse of a light source . . . the challenged claims address broader problems and do not recite a light source. It would be inappropriate to limit the relevant problem to reducing light-source use when the claims themselves are not limited to the presence of a light source and are far broader than responding to the lightsource problems Nielsen identifies . . .The specification thus recognizes that the patent is directed to image processing and facial recognition. The disclosures of the ’243 patent are thus substantial evidence supporting the Board’s determination that the patent is concerned with problems of image processing, particularly facial detection . . . Tian “logically would have commended itself to an inventor’s attention in considering” the identified problems of image processing and facial detection."

"Most of the time utility patent claim construction is based upon the intrinsic record—a clean construction of legal documents . . . The opposite is true in design patent claim construction. Nearly every single design patent case turns upon the factual issue of functionality—which dictates how the design should be compared to the prior art and the accused design . . . . Almost nothing in the way of legal analysis undergirds the claim construction of a picture . . . The concurrence points out other considerations it contends bear on the scope of design patent claims, including the role of broken lines in design patent drafting and the effect of representations made during prosecution . . . There is no reason—and the concurrence provides none—why considerations like these, which can be addressed with a simple jury instruction, otherwise require taking substantially the entire infringement question away from the jury."

"[W]e hold that the representative claims of the Asserted Patents are directed to an abstract idea of “generating and sharing self-contained, interactive charts on computers” or “across websites” . . . he district court stated that “even surpassing plausibility to assume Adobe Flash was not conventionally used, the claim language [of claim 1 of the ’892 patent] does not limit this claim to using Adobe Flash or to any mechanism by which its ideas are accomplished.” J.A. 14. And like the district court correctly concluded, this failure by the claims was “fatal” to iChart’s step-two position . . . we conclude that at Alice step two, there is nothing in the representative claims of the Asserted Patents sufficient to transform them into eligible subject matter."