"Based principally on the guidance provided by the specification, we find Otsuka’s proposed claim construction more persuasive than the construction offered by Hetero. We construe the terms “dextromethorphan” and “quinidine” in the ’282 patent, including their use in the weightto-weight ratio of claim 1, to refer to the form in which those compounds are administered. Applying that construction, we hold that the district court did not err in finding that Otsuka was likely to succeed in proving that Hetero infringed the ’282 patent."

"While at first blush it is appealing to construe the terms “dextromethorphan” and “quinidine” to refer only to the free base forms of those compounds, a close analysis of the claims and specification of the ’282 patent leads us to construe those terms as referring to the compounds whether in free base or salt form."

"The majority’s construction, which calculates the weight-to-weight ratio either using the weight of the active moiety (when administered in the pure “free base” form) or the total weight of a salt compound (when administered in the salt form), is inconsistent with the objective of the invention and is unsupported by the specification and prosecution history . . . The purpose of the invention claimed in the ’282 patent is thus to decrease the blood level of quinidine while maintaining a therapeutically effective blood level of dextromethorphan in a patient that is receiving this treatment . . . Nothing in the intrinsic record indicates that administering quinidine or dextromethorphan in the form of a salt (as opposed to the free base form) has any therapeutic effect related to the efficacy of the combination or that it affects the blood levels of dextromethorphan and quinidine . . . Because, under the correct claim construction, Hetero has raised a substantial question of noninfringement, I would reverse the preliminary injunction."

"The district court granted Pfizer’s motion, concluding that the “C2” in —NHC(O)—C2-C12-alkyl of the ’048 provisional was not an obvious typographical error that it had the power to correct, and therefore the change from — NHC(O)—C2-C12-alkyl in the ’048 provisional to — NHC(O)—C1-C12-alkyl in the ’953 patent impermissibly broadened the scope of the patent such that the ’953 patent was not entitled to priority from the ’048 provisional . . . Here . . . the dispute is whether there is adequate written description support in the ’048 provisional’s disclosure of —NHC(O)— C2-C12-alkyl for the ’953 patent’s disclosure of —NHC(O)— C1-alkyl. That is, whether “2” provides adequate written description support for “1” . . . We conclude that the ’048 provisional does not convey to a skilled artisan that the inventors possessed — NHC(O)—C1-alkyl at the time of the ’048 provisional’s filing date. The ’048 provisional and the ’953 patent recite two different ranges of chemical moieties. The former recites —NHC(O)—C2-C12-alkyl and the latter recites — NHC(O)—C1-C12-alkyl. C2 is simply different from C1, and the ’048 provisional’s disclosure of a range of C2 to C12 provides no support for the ’953 patent’s disclosure of C1 because the ’048 application explicitly includes an alkyl group with two to twelve carbon atoms (i.e., —NHC(O)—C2-C12- alkyl), and notably does not include an alkyl group with one carbon atom (i.e., —NHC(O)—C1-alkyl) . . . , “[e]ntitlement to a filing date . . . extends only to that which is disclosed,” Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1571–72, and —NHC(O)—C1-alkyl was simply not disclosed in the ’048 provisional."

"[T]here are two open disputes regarding the standard. First, we have not fully addressed whether the skilled searcher inquiry poses a question of law, reviewable de novo, or a question of fact, reviewable for clear error. We do not opine on this issue here because we conclude that the district court’s error regarding the Landon IP evidence is apparent under either standard of review. Separately, we have not yet had the opportunity to take a conclusive stance on what “discover[y]” within the skilled searcher inquiry entails . . . The district court purported to rely on classification searches based on the Board’s application of § 315(e)(1) estoppel in the ’136 IPR, which primarily looked to classification searches in identifying the reasonable discoverability of Wörn. The district court also found that classification searching satisfied the standard of reasonableness set forth in certain district court cases to consider the issue of IPR estoppel . . . The district court’s conclusion regarding Kotkin was error. First, as noted above, the Board in the ’136 IPR did not consider mere classification searches, without more, to be the endpoint of its analysis; rather, it went on to consider that these classifications would be manually searched, or that keyword searching could have been used to narrow the classification search results down further to an amount capable of manual review. Similarly, we conclude that the Clearlamp standard relied upon by the district court does not go far enough when an unreviewably large number of references are returned by a skilled searcher’s diligent search. We do not hold that manual review of search results will in all instances be necessary to establish discovery. We also do not go so far as to endorse Valve’s vision of the discoverability standard, though we note the normative force of Valve’s argument that thousands of sources, not further narrowed in any way, likely cannot be considered discovered for estoppel purposes under § 315(e)(2). We hold only that something more is required for estoppel when a classification search alone returns an unreviewable number of search results—a demand not met here.." (emphasis added)

"inserting an introducer through a pedicle of the vertebral body such that an opening at a distal tip of the introducer reaches a cancellous portion of the vertebral body"

". . . that the OptaBlate BVN’s “access cannula” corresponded to the claimed “introducer.” Stryker argued that it did not induce infringement of that limitation because Stryker did not instruct physicians to place the access cannula so that it “reaches” the cancellous portion of the bone . . . The district court concluded that the “reaches” limitation required that the distal tip of the introducer “touch[] or extend[] to” the cancellous portion of the vertebral body and that the evidence did not sufficiently demonstrate that Stryker instructed physicians using its device to extend the access cannula to reach the cancellous bone."

"[A] slide show presented internally to sales personnel instructs “to enter just inside the vertebral body past posterior wall,” but it is again unclear whether this is referring to the access cannula or the tip of the stylet . . . The expert declarations supplied by the parties present conflicting views as to how to interpret these documents. The district court reasonably considered evidence that Stryker instructed that the “stylet tip should barely—if at all—enter the vertebral body,” i.e., the cancellous bone, J.A. 17 (emphasis omitted), and concluded that the slides’ reference to “[f]inal position should be just inside the vertebral body” could be referring to the final position of the stylet tip rather than the tip of the access cannula . . . Boston Scientific appears to contend that by instructing a physician to place the access cannula inside the wall of the vertebral body, Stryker instructs placing the tip of the access cannula through the wall and inside the vertebral body rather than literally inside the wall itself, which is made of cortical bone. As the district court reasonably concluded, this could be read as instructing physicians to place the access cannula such that it reaches the cortical wall rather than the cancellous portion . . . Boston Scientific relies on an internal Stryker document that describes the access cannula as being “placed within the cancellous bone of the spine” . . . While this may well support Boston Scientific’s position, it cannot carry Boston Scientific’s burden to show no substantial question of infringement exists, as it is an internal document, there is no contention that it was given to users of the OptaBlate BVN, and Boston Scientific has not proven what (if any) impact this or other internal materials have on what Stryker conveys to others."

"Medmix presents two main arguments on appeal. The principal argument is that the Board improperly construed the term “at least two ramps” to not require an “inclined plane” . . . Separately, medmix asserts that the Board’s motivation-to-combine findings were not supported by substantial evidence."