1. "First, Ingevity asserts a statutory patent misuse defense under § 271(d) of the Patent Act supported by the related “staple article” doctrine;"
2. "Second, Ingevity argues that its purported tying conduct is immune from antitrust liability under the patent laws and Noerr-Pennington"; and
3. "Third, Ingevity argues that the jury’s antitrust damages award should be vacated because BASF failed to disaggregate the damages caused by Ingevity’s unlawful conduct from those resulting from its lawful patent enforcement and that such disaggregation was required and feasible"

Regarding 1), plaintiff argues that its alleged "tying" was merely control over of contributorily infringing product components ("35 U.S.C. § 271(d) . . . expressly shields conduct that would otherwise be characterized as tying or exclusionary when it is undertaken to prevent contributory infringement as defined in § 271(c)."). However, CAFC finds that the jury considered the factual question whether the articles were contributorily infringing product components and had adequate grounds to conclude that they were not ("That testimony regarding honeycomb use in non-infringing air-intake systems, together with the Park patent, gave the jury sufficient reason to discount Ingevity executives’ testimony and favor BASF’s evidence . . . the jury’s verdict rested on permissible inferences and credibility determinations supported by the record, substantial evidence supports the finding that Ingevity’s honeycombs are staple goods").

Regarding 2), CAFC considers the argument here different from what was argued below ("Ingevity’s immunity argument is no longer in the alternative; it now subsumes its patent misuse defense . . . We may not consider such new and improperly preserved arguments . . . At summary judgment, Ingevity’s immunity argument was based on the theory that what BASF had alleged as tying conduct was actually mere patent enforcement activity and thus immune, and it further agreed that conduct beyond mere enforcement activity was not immune . . . But now, for the first time on appeal, Ingevity erases that distinction . . . It argues that even if the jury found that its honeycomb products are staple goods, its tying conduct is still immune."). Accordingly, CAFC sets the new argument aside (n.b., the DCT's caution, cited approvingly by CAFC, that "the Noerr-Pennington doctrine will [not] help Ingevity if BASF proves the Ingevity product . . . is a staple article of commerce").

Regarding 3), CAFC agrees with the DCT that "“[t]o establish an antitrust injury, BASF was not required to show that the accused conduct was the sole cause of its injury; BASF needed to show that Ingevity’s conduct was a material or substantial cause of its injury.”" As the jury instructions and conclusions were consistent with that analysis ("In light of this evidence and Dr. Mathur’s reliance on a broad set of record documents rather than speculative projections, the jury could reasonably have found both material causation and non-speculative damages"), CAFC affirms.

". . . we conclude that the representative claim is directed to the abstract idea of a template set of specifications—generic in at least some respects (claim 1 requires only two such respects)—that can be tailored (in at least one respect) for final production of the specified product (here an image) to fit the user’s constraints . . . The claim’s calling for collecting and combining information for presentation to the rendering device does not provide a focus on an advance in non-abstract ideas . . . the claim does not call for an improvement in the wireless device’s rendering processes, which it takes as a given (hence the need for tailoring), merely supplying a final set of specifications for rendering within the device’s constraints. Nor does the claim call for any improvement in ordinary computer (here, server) functions, such as receiving, storing, processing, outputting, and transmitting."