(Informal 1-2 line summaries, which certainly should not be relied upon for legal or other research purposes)
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- In this precedential decision, defendant "Pen-Tech
moved for Rule 11 sanctions, contending Epic Tech and
Baker Donelson should be held jointly and severally liable
for Pen-Tech’s attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in PenTech’s defense against allegedly frivolous infringement
claims." The DCT disagreed and denied the fees, but CAFC vacates and remands:
"There were a number of strong indicators prior to the
filing of the suit at issue that the asserted claims were invalid under § 101. First, the Supreme Court decided Alice . . . Second, the PTO determined claims in
two of the three related applications were patentably indistinct from independent claims of the ’317 patent . . . and rejected claims in all three
related applications under § 101 post-Alice . . . Third, and again post-Alice,
the court in Fusion Skill held claims of the related ’315 patent ineligible under § 101. In such circumstances, it does not
suffice for Epic Tech or its counsel to rely only on the presumption of validity when faced with multiple indicators
that these claims were unpatentable under § 101 . . . The court failed to address whether Alice put Epic Tech
on notice of its asserted claims’ potential invalidity . . . The court also failed to adequately address whether the
PTO’s office actions served as notice of potential invalidity . . . The court’s analysis regarding the Fusion Skill holding
likewise fails to provide reviewable reasoning for the
court’s decision."
Ergo, rather than decide that the sanctions were / were not appropriate, finding the DCT's analysis incomplete in failing to consider above, CAFC remands for a more thorough analysis.
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- In this Alice case, CAFC affirms 101 invalidity on web advertising patents. There's some nice distinguishing analysis:
"In SRI International, we held claims
non-abstract that were directed to a “specific technique” for
“using a plurality of network monitors that each analyze
specific types of data on the network and integrating reports from the monitors” to solve the “technological problem” of “identifying hackers or potential intruders into the
network” . . . In Finjan, we held that, although scanning for computer viruses by itself is an abstract idea, the claims were nonetheless non-abstract
because they included limitations corresponding to a “behavior-based” approach to virus scanning which “constitutes an improvement in computer functionality” . . . And in McRO, we held claims focused on an improvement in computer animation non-abstract for setting forth specific rules for, e.g., “evaluat[ing] sub-sequences,
generat[ing] transition parameters or apply[ing] transition
parameters to create a final morph weight set” . . . Ultimately, our determinations in those cases rested on the recitation of specific solutions for solving technological problems in the respective claims.
We cannot say the same is true here.
As the district
court determined, nothing in the claims or specification indicates any specific technological improvements or solutions to an internet-centric problem in advertising.
Instead, the Asserted Patents are directed to combining
two methods of conventional targeted internet advertising,
i.e., using either page context or user browsing history to
select advertisements . . . And the performance score concept is directed to the non-technological
problem of selecting the highest revenue generating advertisement." (my emphasis)
Subject matter scope remains salient.
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- A relatively short 101 ineligibility decision for claims on "calculating profitability" of a software product. Below, the DCT thought the claims eligible at Step 2 for disclosing:
"[a] claimed unconventional combination
[that] improves the functioning and operation of the computer itself by performing parallel computations in a faster
amount of time."
This, despite the DCT agreeing . .
". . . that its construction
of “independently calculate,” which was originally proffered by Berkeley, did not require parallel processing of calculations but would allow for sequential calculations or no
calculations at all . . . (“[A]lthough the patented
invention describes performing the independent calculations simultaneously in an embodiment, there is no necessity to do so, and no such limitation is recited. The claims
intentionally provide direction to perform the independent
calculations simultaneously, sequentially, or if necessary,
not perform some of them at all.")."
CAFC naturally reverses and finds the claims ineligible. Regarding Step 1:
"[T]he district court determined that
claim 1 of the ’521 patent is directed to an abstract idea of
“calculating profitability” . . . We agree . . . This claim is directed to the idea of performing mathematical calculations to determine profitability using a computer to do so. The idea of performing
calculations based on “abstract processes of collecting and
analyzing information, without more,” is an abstract idea."
Regarding Step 2:
"Here, the parties and the district court agree that the
alleged inventive concept of parallel processing is not required by the claim such that a system that does not perform calculations in parallel could still fall within the scope
of the claim . . . Thus, it was legal error
for the district court to nonetheless conclude that parallel
processing supplied the inventive concept for claim 1 of the
’521 patent."
Ergo, CAFC affirms as to the portions already found invalid and reverses to those the DCT considered valid.
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- In this chemical vapor deposition attorneys fees matter (with an extensive history), CAFC affirms the 285 attorney fees:
"[T]he district court made two relevant findings:
(1) plaintiffs pursued objectively baseless infringement positions as to each patent, and (2) plaintiffs litigated in an
unreasonable manner" - CAFC affirms as to (1) so doesn't address (2) - "Claim 12 requires “growing single-crystal diamond . . .
on the growth surface . . . [t]he district court thus concluded that plaintiffs “put
forth no evidence whatsoever that contradicted [the images
from Nouveau] or otherwise demonstrated infringement." )
After briefly addressing joint and several liability, prejudgment interest, etc., CAFC affirms en toto.
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- In this precedential claim construction and 102(b)(2)(B) decision, CAFC affirms the presumption that "the same terms appearing
in different portions of the claims should be given the same
meaning unless it is clear from the specification and prosecution history that the terms have different meanings at
different portions of the claims" - here, the appearances of the term "internal diameter" in claims for "a tool used in the oil and gas industry to assist with inserting a long strip of pipe (the “casing” or “casing string”) to the bottom of a wellbore."
CAFC first confirms that the challenge hasn't been waived:
"Nine neither changed its position on this issue between the trial and appellate levels nor forfeited its
argument that “internal diameter” is a measured diameter . . . the intrinsic evidence does not
clearly require “internal diameter” to have two different
meanings . . . Because the intrinsic record was not clear that “internal diameter” should carry different meanings in
different portions of the claims of the ’445 patent, the district court erred by holding that the term “can refer to both
an inner surface and a measured diameter” . . . Instead, we conclude that the plain meaning of “internal diameter” is a “measured diameter” across the width of the
casing string."
CAFC then similarly agrees that "the district court erred by construing “casing string” to mean “pipe that is customarily
≥ 4.5 inches in outer diameter, which is intended to line the
walls of a drilled well so that a downhole tool can be deployed without restriction”" and that the challenge is similarly preserved:
"Nine proposes the same
construction here as it did to the district court . . . Because the issue was
fully litigated at the district court, Nine has preserved its
challenge to the district court’s construction on appeal . . . On the merits, nothing in the intrinsic record requires
a size limitation on casing string . . . NCS argues that the extrinsic evidence demonstrates
that persons of ordinary skill in the art would understand
“casing string” to have a size of ≥ 4.5 inches in diameter,
“because wellbores that are lined with casing string have a
standard size, and tubing tools for completing well operations have to fit inside of the casing string so they can be
run downhole” . . . NCS primarily relies on industry
catalogs . . . The problem with NCS’s position is that, even if those
catalogs were evidence of definitional plain meaning rather
than mere commonality, any such definition is explicitly
contradicted by the specification."
Next, CAFC addresses a public use challenge, and usefully, and perhaps most importantly, clarifies the bounds o the Sanho decision:
"[In Sanho] Prior to the filing date, the inventor
testified that he “sent to Sanho via private courier a finished version of the [HyperDrive]” and alleged a prior public disclosure . . . Although there was no confidentiality or nondisclosure agreement, there was no teaching of the features of
the invention to others beyond Sanho . . . On
these facts, we [did] not think it [was] a close question . . . . [T]he sale of the HyperDrive here did not publicly disclose the subject matter[.]" . . . In Sanho, we did “not decide exactly what is necessary for demonstrating
that a sale publicly disclosed the relevant subject matter,
or whether to apply the prevailing standard for when a
printed publication is sufficiently publicly accessible to
qualify as prior art.”
Finally, in accordance with the recent Sanho decision, CAFC overturns the jury, since the prior commercial sale was insufficiently "public" to set aside prior art under 102(b)(2)(B):
"As in Sanho, there is no evidence that
AirLocks were widely distributed or placed where the public could examine them. Instead, NCS’s CEO testified that,
even when sold to Tundra, the AirLock was delivered in a
sealed black tube that would have to be cut open . . . NCS has not identified any record evidence that, for example, the public would be able to understand from the black tube that there was a “rupture disc [ ]
configured to disengage from sealing engagement when exposed to a pressure greater than a hydraulic pressure in
the casing string after the casing string has been positioned in the wellbore and the region of the tubular member where the rupture disc is attached has a larger internal
diameter than the internal diameter of the casing string” . . . Thus, as in Sanho, while there
was no non-disclosure agreement, there was no teaching."
Ergo, after addressing various other miscellaneous issues, CAFC vacates and remands.
James Skelley is a solo practitioner based in Mountain View, California since 2015, focusing primarily upon technology transactions and intellectual property procurement. James' practice also serves as an "incubator" for new legal service technologies / methodologies and a "living example" of their application. To this end, James regularly partners with larger law firms and with his clients so as to improve the practice of intellectual property law.
- Utility / Design / PCT Patent Prosecution
- Open Source Diligence
- Technology Transactions (typically as a team)
- Litigation / Inter Partes Review Support (typically as a team)
- James tends NOT to handle low-volume trademark work (though referrals are available)
- USPTO - #59458 - 10/16/2006
- California - #257829 - 12/01/2008
- District Columbia - #1014986 - 08/05/2013
- James is available by email, 8x8 hangout, and in-person meetups in the Valley.
- Email is typically the best way to reach James.
- Machine Learning / Robotics
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- Manufacturing / 3D Printing
- James tends NOT to handle pure chemistry applications (though referrals are available), however James HAS handled matters involving computational proteomics, cellular modeling, and diagnostic lab protocols
LawMux Bites are (very) short, one-page summaries of various legal concepts, cases, and technologies. As informal summaries, you certainly shouldn't rely upon them as legal advice / for business use, but they can help orient you if you're new to the subject matter.