1. Exclude plaintiff's "damages expert’s testimony and methods relying on the aforementioned license" (which was excluded for failure to apportion); and
2. Reduce "the jury’s damages award from $10 million to $1 nominal damages."

1. Affirms "the denial of Appellants’ motion to transfer venue and . . . the denial of Appellants’ affirmative defense of unclean hands" and "the ’248, ’609, and ’088 [as to Kartri Sales only] patent infringement findings";
   • Regarding venue, it appears the motion wasn't timely ("[T]he district court here soundly exercised its discretion in finding that Kartri’s venue objection “simply took too long” . . . unlike in Oath Holdings, Appellants here waited much longer to file their transfer motion, continuing to litigate for several months in the Southern District of New York following TC Heartland.").
   • As for the unclean hands of 1), CAFC doesn't find this timely raised or, in any event, adequately demonstrating specific intent ("Marquis does not allege any specific intent before the district court or on appeal.").
   • The infringement follows from the claim constructions below.
2. Vacates "(1) the trade dress infringement finding; (2) the willfulness finding; and (3) the award of attorneys’ fees" as well as "the ’088 patent infringement finding [for Marquis only]" and "the HOOKLESS® trademark infringement finding"; and
   • Regarding trade dress, "Appellants also contend the trade dress is invalid because it comprises the subject matter of the expired ’232 utility patent" and "The district court’s functionality determination . . . ignored TrafFix’s instruction to compare whether “the expired patent claim[s] the features [of the trade dress] in question.”"
   • As for willfulness, this likewise falls: "Given our ruling above vacating the district court’s trade dress infringement finding, we must also vacate the district court’s finding that Appellants willfully infringed Focus’s unregistered trade dress" and ditto for the patents ("On remand, the court should determine if Kartri’s belief was reasonable in light of our reversal of the ’248 and ’609 infringement determinations and our vacatur of the ’088 infringement ruling for Marquis").
   • Regarding attorney's fees, "The district court did not abuse its discretion when it deemed this case exceptional," however, its determination "does not distinguish between work on patent infringement versus work on trademark infringement." Ergo, because CAFC "vacated and reversed a part of the district court’s infringement determination, it is necessary to recalculate the sum of attorneys’ fees to correctly apportion fees related to work where Focus still maintains prevailing party status."
   • CAFC vacates for the '088 in 2) because, while agreeing with the DCT's construction, "its infringement analysis on this issue was, at a minimum, inadequate to sustain summary judgment . . . the district court needed to explain why a portion of the accused ring’s outer edge section constitutes a “projecting edge” that projects off of the outer circumference, as opposed to simply being a continuation of the ring’s “outer circumference.” The district court also needed to address Marquis’s argument that its construction produces nonsensical results, i.e., if we remove the “projecting edge” allegedly found in Appellants’ product, the ring would be destroyed."
   • As for the Hookless mark in 2), "the district court’s “similarity of the marks” analysis erroneously relied on a comparison between the parties’ products."
3. Reverses "the EZ ON trademark infringement finding . . . the ’248 and ’609 patent infringement findings."
   • Regarding the '248 and '609 infringement, "the prosecution histories of the relevant asserted patents show that the patent owner clearly disavowed a ring having a flat upper edge . . . The prosecution history here paints a clear and consistent picture that the ’248 and ’609 patents exclude shower rings having a flat upper edge . . . by cooperating with the examiner’s repeated demand to exclude rings with a flat upper edge from the ’248 and ’609 patents, in keeping with the initial restriction requirement, the patent owner made it clear that it accepted the narrowed claim scope for these patents." Based on these constructions, CAFC reverses the '248 and '609 infringement.
   • As for the EZ ON mark, there appears to be a lack of standing ("Appellants contend the district court erred in finding that a 2012 licensing agreement between third-party Carnation Home Fashions, Inc. (Carnation) and Focus proved that Focus owned the mark prior to the lawsuit, when in fact Carnation was the owner of the EZ ON mark. According to Appellants, this is because the district court misread Section 4.2 of the 2012 agreement, which granted Carnation “the right to use the following trademark on the Licensed Products: ‘EZ ON Shower Curtain,’” to mean that Focus, rather than Carnation, owned the EZ ON mark . . . We agree with Appellants that Focus did not satisfy its burden to establish standing, because the only evidence Focus relies on—the 2012 licensing agreement— does not show that Focus owned the EZ ON mark at the relevant time.").

1. "Rideshare contends that the Board erred in its claim construction of the term “generate” in the claim phrase “generate a signal representing an indicator.”" - however, CAFC believes both the "plain meaning of the claim, and a proper grammatical construction" accord with the Board's interpretation;
2. "Rideshare argues that there is not substantial evidence to support the Board’s determination that Lalancette discloses a “communication device associated with the driver of a vehicle.”" - CAFC again disagrees, as Lalancett's "specification states that examples of mobile communication devices include cell phones, smart phones, mobile email devices, and digital personal assistants, and nothing in the specification supports limiting the definition of a mobile communication device in the way Rideshare suggests.";
3. "Rideshare argues that there is not substantial evidence to support the Board’s determination that Kalanick in combination with Kemler discloses sending a “[notification] signal . . . when [a] vehicle is within a predetermined distance from a specific location.”" - yet again, CAFC finds expert testimony and disclosure within the reference adequate to support the Board's reasoning; and
4. "Rideshare argues that there is not substantial evidence to support the Board’s determination that the combination of Kalanick and Kemler discloses the system “in response to receipt of a signal from the user, generate and transmit a first signal representing an indicator” because Kalanick teaches the user sending a signal, and Kemler teaches a central controller sending a signal representing the indicator to the driver’s device." - CAFC here disagrees because the argument "supposes that there must be a direct relationship between the user’s request and transmitting the signal" but CAFC doesn't believe that "the claims require a direct link and exclude a causal chain."

1. ("similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression") - CAFC vacates and remands this factor based upon its analysis of the sixth factor below;
2. ("the similarity of the parties’ goods and/or services") the Board found that this weighs for confusion, and CAFC agrees, since, e.g., dictionary definitions of banking services include credit cards;
3. ...
6. ("[t]he number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods") The Board found confusion below, but here, "Apex contends that the Board erred in limiting the relevant public to consumers of credit card services and that the Board should have considered the 42 other third-party marks that use Aspire and Aspire-formative marks" and CAFC agrees ("When analyzing the sixth Dupont factor, however, the Board restricted the universe of marks it considered to only those relating to credit card services and excluded marks related to other banking and financing services. That was an error.").