"In this appeal, Google raises two challenges to the Board’s determination that Bushee is not prior art. Google asserts that the Board relied on “legally insufficient” evidence to corroborate Dr. Tsaparas’s inventor testimony of conception . . . Google also argues that the Board did not have substantial evidence to support the Board’s finding that the ’704 patent’s inventors exercised reasonably continuous diligence in reducing the invention to practice."

"Microsoft Word metadata can provide independent corroboration of inventor statements and documents contained in Word files because we have held that “metadata is independent of [an inventor’s] own statements and documents.” Id. The disclosure metadata independently corroborates Dr. Tsaparas’s inventor testimony."

"[In Mulder] a draft U.S. patent application had been prepared for nearly three months and yet “the record show[ed] no activity of any kind in this country.” Id. (cleaned up). Here, Valtrus accounted for the entire period during which diligence is required, including the disputed period, using timestamp evidence of the inventors and a law firm office collaborating in the United States to complete, execute, and file the application resulting in the ’704 patent."

"Claim 1 recites only that the first “electronic device” must be “internet and networking capable” and must include at least one “physical output display” and “input transducer” . . .The claim does not address the structure of the second “electronic device” at all. In addition, the specification discloses that the claimed invention adds “communications or remote control capabilities to known devices” like “medical devices, therapy devices, rehabilitation devices” . . . Thus, we conclude that Claim 1 recites generic hardware that does not render the claim non-abstract."

"[W]e find this articulation of the ordered combination insufficient because it is a mere restatement of the abstract idea. Each of these steps goes directly to the idea of remotely treating a patient. Our jurisprudence is well-settled that “the abstract idea cannot supply the inventive concept."

CAFC concludes "that claim 1 of the ’403 patent is directed to the abstract idea of preventing skipping advertisements by receiving, organizing, displaying, and controlling access to data . . . The claim achieves the goal of preventing skipping advertisements via steps that do nothing more than receive, organize, display, and control access to data, which places the claim squarely in line with those claims we have previously determined to be directed to computer-implemented abstract ideas . . . Consumers have used analog technology to skip advertisements in media for decades. Piranha’s own filings at the district court confirm that “copyright holders . . . giving away their content for free . . . was a problem associated with many, if not all, forms of pre-existing media distribution. For example, broadcast, cable, internet, and satellite broadcasts could be recorded and during playback, ads could be fast forwarded.” J.A. 552 (emphasis added). We conclude that claim 1 does not solve a technological problem."

"We are not persuaded by Piranha’s argument that claim 1 includes an inventive concept because the claimed intersplicer “offer[s] a specific improvement over the prior art” . . . Piranha’s citations to the specification amount to little more than the insertion of the word “novel” or “novelty” before one or more of the intersplicer’s generic functions."

"This case is unlike In re Hogan and In re Entresto because all tested variants of the claimed genus could have been created at the time of the priority date, although they were tested by Pioneer afterward. “[T]he use of post-priority-date evidence to show that a patent does not disclose a representative number of species of a claimed genus is proper.” Amgen I, 872 F.3d at 1375. It was not error for the Board to rely on the post-priority experimental data that Pioneer provided to establish that the challenged claims were not enabled. "

"First, we construe “transmitting electric . . . signals over air” in claim 1 to mean transmitting signals over air in electric form—something neither party disputes is scientifically impossible . . . Satius argues that “transmitting electric . . . signals over air” is not scientifically impossible because, properly construed, this language refers “to the fact that the electric signal [transmitted within the device] will be transformed into an electromagnetic signal, and then that electromagnetic signal is what will go out over the air and to its destination” . . . We do not agree. Transmitting signals over the air is not the same as transmitting signals to the air . . . We conclude the claims are invalid for lack of enablement because, to comply with 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)’s enablement requirement, “the specification must enable the full scope of the invention as defined by its claims” . . . This standard cannot possibly be met when, as here, the claims include an express limitation that adds inoperable (and thus non-enabled) alternative embodiments to the scope of the invention."

• Here's the patent.
• Compare: PAVO SOLUTIONS LLC v. KINGSTON TECHNOLOGY COMPANY, INC. ("changing "case" to "cover" where the latter was intended")
• Compare: CANATEX COMPLETION SOLUTIONS, INC. v. WELLMATICS, LLC ("[T]here is only one correction that is reasonable given the intrinsic evidence")

"[claim 1’s preamble does not refer] to transforming an electric signal to an electromagnetic signal that is then transmitted over air because this would require rewriting claim 1 to provide for an electricto-electromagnetic transformation step that (1) does not exist in the claim language and (2) would not apply equally to claim 1’s “electric . . . signals” and “electromagnetic signals.”"