"The Board denied FedEx’s motion, stating that . . it “should not determine whether an unnamed party is a real party in interest in a proceeding if [that] determination is ‘not necessary to resolve the proceeding.’” . . .The Board explained that such a determination was warranted only when adding the unnamed party would create a § 315 time-bar or estoppel issue. Because Qualcomm filed its petitions within the deadline for Roambee to file a petition, the Board held that no time bar would apply absent bad faith, gamesmanship, or prejudice that would prevent amendment."

"[W]e conclude that FedEx’s challenges grounded in § 312(a)(2) fall within § 314(d)’s scope and are thus unreviewable . . . while FedEx attempts to cast doubt on whether § 312(a)(2) is related to the decision to institute by emphasizing the absence of language expressly referencing “institution,” this fails in light of our precedent. We have already held that challenges to the Board’s § 312(a)(2) determinations are unreviewable because § 312(a)(2) is “an institution-related statute,” notwithstanding the absence of any express reference to institution."

"[The challenge in SAS concerned how the Board’s review would proceed after institution and not whether the choice to grant institution was correct . . . In other words, the petitioner in SAS was not challenging the fact that the agency instituted, but rather the manner of execution—that it did not institute review of all the asserted claims, which the statutory scheme mandated the agency do . . . see also Thryv . . . distinguishing the challenge in SAS as being rooted in “the manner in which the agency’s review ‘proceeds’ once instituted,” whereas the challenge in Thryv was over “whether the agency should have instituted review at all.” . . . we have held that “allegations of acting in excess of statutory jurisdiction ‘closely tied to the application and interpretation of statutes related to the [agency’s] decision to initiate’ IPR, without more, do not overcome § 314(d)’s bar.”"

"Claim 17 recites a QAM symbol constellation that is “optimized” for PD capacity to achieve a particular result: capacity at a reduced signal-to-noise ratio compared to conventional QAM signal constellations that maximize d_min . . . The claim itself does not recite how to achieve a constellation “optimized” for PD capacity. Rather, this important and distinguishing element of the claim is described in a result-oriented way . . . That is, the claim recites a constellation optimized for PD capacity such that it achieves a better capacity when compared to the prior art constellations that were maximized for dmin. Similar to the Supreme Court’s reasoning in O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853), we conclude that claim 17 is ineligible because it is an abstract, result-oriented claim directed to all ways of achieving a recited result . . . Applying the principles in Morse and ChargePoint here, the breadth of claim 17 demonstrates that the claim is directed to the abstract idea of “optimizing” a constellation for PD capacity . . . This broad claim language covers all manners and ways of optimizing a constellation based on one of a limited number of known characteristics of constellations—capacity—and one of a limited number of known capacity measures—PD capacity."

"Instead of claiming the abstract idea of “optimizing” a constellation for capacity without limiting the optimization to any meaningful process or any constraints, the constellation claims are directed to “specific constellations” that the inventors developed using the techniques described in the specifications . . . this distinction between the result-oriented optimization claims and constellation claims makes all the difference . . . Rather than broadly claiming all means of “optimizing,” claim 21 is an application of the described process with parameters representing the described invention, including that “the plurality of unique point locations are unequally spaced,” “each have a location and a different label,” and “the locations of at least two of the constellation points are the same.” . . . Thus, claim 21 in its entirety is directed to solving a particular technological problem—overcoming capacity constraints to improve coding gains—using a particular technological solution—specific, non-uniform constellations with overlapping constellation point locations."

1. “our device complies with the standard” and “if the patent is genuinely an SEP, then the FRAND obligations should be considered when calculating damages”

is not ALSO a stipulation by the defendant that


2. “Because our device complies with the standard, we admit to infringement.”

• “The jury instructions demonstrate that the stipulation was conditional and directed only to the damages context upon a finding of infringement.”
• “That TQ Delta and the ITU have such an agreement does not end the standard essentiality inquiry for infringement purposes; it merely reflects the existence of a contractual commitment to license those patents on FRAND terms”
• “CommScope also pointed to the jury verdict form, which left infringement of the ’008 patent for the jury to decide”; and
• Plaintiff's expert made some unfortunate statements: “[Plaintiff’s expert] . . . conceded on cross examination that he did not know whether the ITU makes any official or binding standard essentiality determination . . . Indeed, CommScope provided evidence that the VDSL2 standard itself provides that the ITU “takes no position” on whether a patent is essential to a standard . . . The jury therefore could have reasonably discounted TQ Delta’s conclusory testimony and found that it failed to establish that practicing the VDSL2 standard necessarily practices claim 14 . . . The jury was also free to find that compliance with the VDSL2 standard did not require “computing a phase shift,” as the claim requires.”

"electronically determining an identification of the electronic work based on the extracted features, wherein the identification is based on a non-exhaustive search identifying a neighbor; "

"The written description does not contain the terms “exhaustive” or “non-exhaustive,” but instead contrasts “linear search[es]” which “can be computationally very expensive” with “[o]ther forms of matching,” including “kd-trees, vantage point trees and excluded middle vantage point forests” / / / / nothing in the written description suggests that a skilled artisan would understand a “linear search” to be interchangeable with a “non-exhaustive search” . . . [i]ndeed, the phrase “non-exhaustive search” appears nowhere in the original patent application that led to the ’988 and ’464 patents, but rather was added to the claims nine years after the filing."

• The first claim set relates to “mapping AR objects and rendering them on a device display”; and
• The second relates to “incorporating visual objects into a digital representation of an environment surrounding an AR device”