"The Board’s finding “that one device in a ‘better position’ than the other devices [to handle a subsequent user query] then exits its low power mode and ‘wakes up’ so it can respond to any subsequent user query” is unsupported by substantial evidence because it assumes a causal relationship between two steps Rosenberger discloses as independent alternatives . . . Sonos argues we may nevertheless affirm under its alternative theory that Rosenberger anticipates the challenged claims because Rosenberger’s devices remain in a low power mode other than Rosenberger’s self-described, low power “listening” mode during coordination . . . It is undisputed, however, that the Board made no fact findings regarding this alternative “low power mode” theory in its FWDs . . . We decline to make fact findings regarding this alternative theory in the first instance and leave this issue for the Board to consider on remand."

"Dr. Appel explained how ovens, fluid beds, and coating pans were capable of handling hundreds of kilograms of tablets at a time and were also common pieces of equipment found in drug manufacturing facilities. Dr. Appel further explained why a coating pan would have been an especially attractive piece of heating equipment, as it allowed large scale curing, followed by coating, and thus a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been especially motivated to use a coating pan to cure Bartholomäus’s PEO tablets at scale to maximize manufacturing efficiency."

"Here, the remedy Ms. Hafeman seeks, and its relationship to institution, eliminates any doubt that § 314(d) bars our review. Ms. Hafeman argues the Board “should have terminated the IPRs in light of the Sotera violation, or at minimum, addressed why the IPRs should proceed in the FWDs” . . . And she requests that we vacate the Board’s final written decisions and “remand with instructions to dismiss” the IPRs. . . . The problem with Ms. Hafeman’s challenge is that it seeks to terminate the IPRs for reasons related to the institution decision because the Sotera stipulation was a consideration for institution. This makes clear that her challenge “has institution as its direct, immediate, express subject” and is thus beyond our review . . . This is not a situation where our review of termination is unrelated to the institution decision . . . "

"Did ecobee prove by clear and convincing evidence that the limitations of the asserted claims of the ’495 Patent, when taken individually or when taken as an ordered combination, involve only technology which a person of ordinary skill in the art would have considered to be well-understood, routine, and conventional as of April 9, 2004? "

"However, neither the district court’s Alice step two verdict form nor the related jury instructions informed the jury that the ’495 patent’s claims were directed to an abstract idea, much less specified what that abstract idea was. Nor did they instruct the jury that the abstract idea itself could not supply the inventive concept under Alice step two . . . Similarly, the district court’s instructions did not include any identification of or reference to the abstract idea, instead noting only that step one “is one for the Court to decide and not the jury” . . . the district court’s instruction was inconsistent with this Court’s precedent. This Court has explained that “[a]fter identifying an ineligible concept at step one, we ask at step two ‘[w]hat else is there in the claims before us?’” . . . Consistent with that principle, this Court’s precedent evaluates the alleged inventive concept at step two in light of the abstract idea identified at step one . . . None of the cases cited by Ollnova permit consideration of step two without first identifying7 an abstract idea at step one."

"The Asserted Patents relate “to automated systems and methods for capturing, processing and sharing farming data, and more particularly to systems and methods for capturing farming operation data in real time using passive data collection devices attached to farming equipment while the farming equipment is used to perform the farming operations, and then processing and sharing the farming operation data via an online farming data exchange system or server” . . . As a preliminary matter, AGI points to nothing in the language of the claims which refers to “interoperability” problems between different brands of farm equipment. Even accepting arguendo, moreover, AGI’s assertion that its claims disclose a specific solution to the “problem of the incompatibility of electronic communications systems in farming equipment due to their use of different communication protocols,” id. at 29, the claims are nonetheless directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea . . . in explicit terms, the specification describes the claimed invention as a computer-implemented method for gathering and processing farming data . . . We reject, moreover, AGI’s assertion that its claims are not directed to an abstract idea because the claimed system has the ability to detect the communication protocol that is being used by a specific piece of farm equipment and relies on a “plurality of different ‘implement profiles’ stored in memory, each of which defines a communication protocol needed to ‘decode’ messages that are sent from a particular farming implement with which it is associated” . . . [The] claims are not directed to a specific improvement in computer functionality but instead invoke the use of generic computer components to collect, analyze, and transmit farming data."

"While AGI’s claimed system relies on automation to speed up the process of collecting and decoding data transmitted from farm equipment, “the improved speed inherent with applying [an] abstract idea using a computer” does not establish an inventive concept at Alice step two . . . Thus, whether we view the claim elements individually or as an ordered combination, they contain no inventive concept that would transform the abstract idea of collecting, interpreting, and transmitting data about farming operations into a patent-eligible application of that idea."