"The specification confirms that the term “determining” allows for estimations . . (indicating that “determin[ing] the dimensions and slopes of the roof sections” may be based on “closely estimat[ing] the dimensions and slopes of the roofs”). Moreover, embodiments in the specification describe “accurately determin[ing] the pitch,” indicating that accuracy is not built into the meaning of “determining” . . . Accordingly, Eagle View’s argument that the term “determine” excludes approximation, estimation, or “near calculation” lacks merit."

"[W]e find no evidence in the specification to suggest that “calculate” requires a certain level of accuracy. Instead, the specification indicates that the term “calculate” refers to obtaining a result via the performance of mathematical steps . . . (“The slope can be easily calculated from such a representation using basic trigonometry.”). "

RoM’s position that these lines show what aspects are functional and what aspects are ornamental suggests, however, that all design elements must be either completely ornamental or completely functional. Our case law does not support this proposition. . . . as the district court correctly recognized, RoM’s proposed approach of treating the D’155 patent’s disclaimer of elements as dispositive of the functionality inquiry would have courts blindly accept that “every feature depicted in solid lines in design patents [is] per se ornamental.”

"“[R]equested” is not only a grammatical descriptor, but also is a status indicator reflecting a completed action—the receiving of a request. Because the second limitation expressly references “said requested SM object,” it necessarily depends on the first limitation having been performed. The buffer cannot be allocated to cache a “requested” SM object if no request has been received."

CAFC affirms this SJ DTSA and 3PB decision. Basically, employees at McKinsey, while at McKinsey, researched APT's business then left to begin a competing enterprise.

Regarding the DTSA, CAFC agrees . . .

" . . . with the district court’s conclusion that APT failed to sufficiently identify and define its alleged trade secrets under the statutory definition. Specifically, APT’s response to Appellees’ interrogatories and APT’s opposition to Appellees’ summary-judgment motion failed to identify and define its alleged trade secrets “in a manner that allows the fact-finder to determine if a trade secret exists under the statute . . . Even under Utah law, plaintiffs must still sufficiently identify and define their trade secrets"

Regarding the 3PB, CAFC likewise finds insufficient evidence under Utah law ("Under Utah law, “[a] third party may claim a contract benefit only if the parties to the contract clearly express an intention ‘to confer a separate and distinct benefit’ on the third party” . . . The contract here was an employee-employer agreement between Mr. Stoddard and McKinsey.").

Ergo, affirmed.

" . . . presented testimony that the Nihei/Nantz combination satisfies all the limitations of the asserted claims, that a person of skill in the art would be motivated to combine Nihei and Nantz, and that secondary considerations do not support a conclusion of nonobviousness. However, the district court denied Autel’s motion for JMOL as to obviousness because it found substantial evidence that “Nihei and Nantz fail to teach or suggest the Asserted Claims’ ‘portable setting apparatus’ limitations” and accordingly “[did] not reach the other obviousness-related issues raised by the [p]arties.”"