"[W]e hold that the representative claims of the Asserted Patents are directed to an abstract idea of “generating and sharing self-contained, interactive charts on computers” or “across websites” . . . he district court stated that “even surpassing plausibility to assume Adobe Flash was not conventionally used, the claim language [of claim 1 of the ’892 patent] does not limit this claim to using Adobe Flash or to any mechanism by which its ideas are accomplished.” J.A. 14. And like the district court correctly concluded, this failure by the claims was “fatal” to iChart’s step-two position . . . we conclude that at Alice step two, there is nothing in the representative claims of the Asserted Patents sufficient to transform them into eligible subject matter."

"[T]he Board held that, for purposes of AIA § 102(d)(2), a reference patent receives the filing date of an earlier application as long as it satisfies the “ministerial requirements” of §§ 119 and 120 and the earlier application “describes the subject matter relied upon in the reference patent.” Because the Board found that Carrier’s provisional application described the subject matter on which the petition relied, it concluded that Carrier qualified as prior art as of the provisional application’s filing date."

"Section 102(d) therefore incorporates that substantive requirement, and there is nothing in its text that exempts prior art determinations from § 119(e)(1)’s entitlement requirements or otherwise creates a different, less demanding “ministerial” standard for prior art purposes . . . Congress chose language requiring the satisfaction of statutory-based substantive requirements, not language merely permitting an applicant to invoke priority . . . the statutory text requires § 112(a) support for at least one of the prior art patent’s published claims before that reference may obtain an earlier filing date for prior art purposes." (emphasis added)

"We strongly disfavor construing “terms in a way that renders them void, meaningless, or superfluous” . . . Because claim 1 provides that the string guides are both “mounted to” and “rotatable,” Ravin’s proposed construction would render the claimed “rotatable around a first axis” and “rotatable around a second axis” limitations superfluous . . . Similarly, the written description does not limit the “mounted to” connection to allow only rotational movement but repeatedly describes the string guides, “mounted to” the limbs, are “rotatable” . . . We see no error in the Board’s construction of “mounted to” to mean “connected to, either directly or indirectly,” and Ravin poses no separate challenge to the Board’s anticipation finding under this construction. We therefore affirm the unpatentability of claim 1 of the ’015 patent."

"[The Board] found, based on a fully developed record, that “level of physical fitness” may be conveyed through physical characteristics, such as stride length and body weight, when such characteristics are viewed in relation to one another . . . we must reject Nike’s argument that certain physical characteristics cannot be included in evaluating a “level of physical fitness.” As the Board noted, the claim’s “broad phrasing” suggests “level of physical fitness” should not be limited, and the ’413 patent specification does not further cabin the term . . . Substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that Amano anticipates limitation."

"Although this court has “cautioned against limiting the claimed invention to preferred embodiments or specific examples in the specification” . . . we have also recognized that disclosed embodiments and examples “can shed light on the intended scope of the claims” . . . Here, the fact that all six examples in the specification describe using the “dissolving agent” combination of an organic acid and a polyalcohol to dissolve the lidocaine bolsters the conclusion that the claimed dissolving agent must dissolve the lidocaine and not simply prevent crystallization of the lidocaine in the finished patch."