"We agree with EOFlow. Insulet is barred from “refiling of the same claim” of patent infringement because the statute of limitations expired in June 2024 with respect to acts of infringement in June 2018, and the dismissals occurred on January 3, 2025, more than six years later. "

" . . . ongoing patent infringement “‘comprises a “series of discrete infringing acts,” each of which is a distinct harm giving rise to an independent claim for relief that starts a new limitations period’” . . . Regardless of whether Insulet may still file patent infringement claims for some alleged acts of infringement, the statute of limitations had expired with respect to EOFlow’s alleged June 2018 infringement."

"Under the DTSA, the statute of limitations expires “3 years after the date on which the misappropriation with respect to which the action would relate is discovered or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been discovered . . . A variety of cases in California state and federal courts have interpreted this provision to mean that “[w]hen a plaintiff brings suit against an individual defendant for separate misappropriations of related trade secrets, or for multiple misappropriations of a single secret, the date of accrual is the date of the initial misappropriation” . . . we must determine whether, under the access-plus-similarity standard and Merck discovery standard, Insulet knew or should have known of facts sufficient to plead access and similarity as to one of the asserted trade secrets before the critical date . . . By March 15, 2019, which was more than three years before Insulet filed its original complaint on August 3, 2023, internal Insulet emails showed that Insulet knew Mr. DiIanni worked with EOFlow on the EOPatch 2 . . . The undisputed facts thus demonstrate Insulet, by March 2019, had sufficient knowledge to allege that EOFlow hired a former employee to work on the EOPatch 2 who had knowledge of and access to Insulet’s trade secrets, which satisfies the access prong as a matter of law . . . The statute of limitations begins to run with respect to all trade secrets disclosed during substantially the same time to that defendant by the same person for the same purpose . . . The district court here should have granted JMOL because the statute of limitations expired before Insulet filed its complaint on August 3, 2023

"We need not decide whether EOFlow’s proposed inquiry-notice standard or Insulet’s proposed Merck standard applies. We conclude that even under the more demanding Merck standard, the statute of limitations expired before Insulet filed its complaint because the undisputed evidence shows that Insulet knew or should have known before the critical date the facts it needed to sufficiently plead a trade secret misappropriation claim against EOFlow."

"[T]he majority overturns the jury’s verdict based on legal theories that EOFlow neither presses nor develops. The majority errs in four main ways: (1) it conflates its application of the discovery rule with the inquiry-notice standard, (2) it adopts a framework not supported by the case law, (3) it encourages plaintiffs to race to the courthouse with undeveloped claims based on mere suspicion, and (4) it improperly substitutes our own fact findings for those of the jury."

"I agree with the majority that the access-plus-similarity framework helps determine when a reasonably diligent plaintiff should have discovered the misappropriation, but I do not agree with how the majority defines the access-plus-similarity framework and applies it to the facts in this case. "

"[R]ather than draw inferences from the complaint that are unfavorable to Insulet, I would view the facts developed at trial in the light most favorable to Insulet—the prevailing party—as is required by our standard of review." (emphasis in original)

"The majority also holds that Insulet could have discovered the misappropriation if only it had pored over a predominantly Korean-language, 500-page prospectus filed with Korean financial regulators in July 2020—mere weeks before the critical date of August 3, 2020 . . . The standard is reasonable diligence, not maximum feasible diligence . . . The analysis the majority seeks from the dissent was for the jury to conduct, not this court."

"The trial evidence established that the AutoHop code runs in the background even when a viewer has not enabled the AutoHop feature, but that AutoHop only skips commercials if (1) a user has enabled it prior to starting an episode and (2) the episode is playing, not in fast-forward or rewind. These two conditions (AutoHop on and episode playing) are encoded in separate variables within the AutoHop source code. When AutoHop encounters a segment bookmark, it checks whether both conditions are satisfied. If the user has enabled commercial skipping and the device is not in rewind or fast-forward, AutoHop skips the commercial; otherwise, it lets the commercial play. That evidence permitted only one conclusion: AutoHop did not provide for the direct disablement of navigation objects."

Nor is it possible to set aside that distinction under the doctrine of equivalents . . . the trial record does not contain any other “particularized testimony and linking argument as to the insubstantiality of the differences between” AutoHop’s announcement files and the structure described by the ’799 Patent . . . Moreover, ClearPlay’s theory would erase the claims’ meaningful structural and functional distinction between a “single-object” approach and one that shares elements across multiple objects, even though the ’799 Patent treats that distinction as one “in kind,” not degree."

"We disagree with the district court’s reading of Sixth Circuit precedent. Though the Sixth Circuit did uphold damages awards that were calculated using royalties-based damages models in Vitro Corp. and Mid-Michigan, it did not preclude the plaintiff from seeking unjust enrichment damages altogether . . . The district court’s preclusion of unjust enrichment damages impacted Versata’s ability to seek damages throughout this case, including at trial and during posttrial proceedings. Accordingly, we partially vacate the district court’s JMOL zeroing out the jury’s damages award and remand for a new trial on damages for trade secret misappropriation."

"We therefore conclude that the district court erred when it determined that Versata did not present any evidence that would allow the jury to calculate damages with reasonable certainty. Versata’s and Ford’s expert testimony, the submission of the MSSA and the 2011 addendum, and the jury instructions given by Versata’s counsel during closing arguments all amount to sufficient evidence that provided the jury with a discernible path to properly calculate damages. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s reduction of breach of contract damages and reinstate the jury award of $82,260,000 to Versata."

"[W]e find no clear error in the district court’s analysis of the skilled artisan’s motivation to modify the reduction step of Kondo specifically. As the district court noted, both experts agreed that many of the steps of Kondo would have been considered for modification, including the reduction step . . . And Dr. Dichtel presented significant testimony about why a skilled artisan would have sought to modify Kondo’s reduction step, including cost savings, improvement of the reaction’s safety profile, post-processing simplification, and knowledge that the hydrogenating agent was already being used in molar excess . . . This evidence, tethered to the chemical realities of the reaction, is a far cry from the conclusory expert testimony our case law rejects . . . We therefore decline to find clear error in the district court’s choice to credit this testimony."

"The distinction . . . matters: constitutional standing “is a jurisdictional requirement” that is “incurable if absent at the initiation of suit,” whereas a statutory standing defect is “curable by joinder” . . . Accordingly, a plaintiff may have constitutional standing without satisfying the additional statutory requirement of possessing “all substantial rights” . . . In attempting to reconcile our precedents, some district courts have drawn a bright line between our cases addressing constitutional standing and those addressing statutory standing, concluding that cases addressing one side of that line have little, if any, relevance to cases on the other side . . . although the two standing inquiries are distinct, the same facts bearing on whether a patent owner has granted “all substantial rights” to a licensee to enable the licensee to have statutory standing may also bear on whether the owner retained “an exclusionary right” sufficient for constitutional standing."

"In this case, Plaintiff retains a sublicensing veto that (while it must be reasonably exercised) prevents Ingevity from granting sublicenses absent Plaintiff’s consent or free of Plaintiff’s royalty interest . . . That consent right over sublicensing helps preserve Plaintiff’s exclusionary interest because it prevents the licensee from unilaterally authorizing an accused infringer’s practice of the patents without Plaintiff’s approval and royalty interests. Moreover, “infringement would amount to an invasion of [Plaintiff’s] legally protected interest” in the patents because it deprives it of royalties to which it is entitled as a patent owner . . . Plaintiff’s right to sue, right to veto sublicenses, and royalty interests confirm that Plaintiff retains an exclusionary right, establishing that Plaintiff retains a concrete stake in excluding unauthorized practice of the patents and a mechanism to enforce that interest . . . On these facts, Plaintiff retained an exclusionary right sufficient for Article III standing, namely the non-illusory right to sue that their licensee, Ingevity, could not nullify through unilateral, royalty-free sublicensing." (emphasis added)