generating a new password for said first secure computer network based at least upon the token and a passcode, wherein the token is not known to the user and wherein the passcode is known to the user;

setting a password associated with the user to be the new password

"Dynapass argues the district court erred in construing “receiving the password” in claim 12 to preclude separate receipt of the “passcode” and “token” components of the password . . . While the written description discloses multiple embodiments for authenticating a user, the patentee’s chosen claim language unambiguously does not extend to the al- ternative embodiment where the passcode and token are received separately . . . Claim 1 recites (1) “generating a new password . . . based at least upon the token and a passcode;” (2) “setting a pass- word . . . to be the new password;” and then (3) “receiving the password from the user . . . .” This language requires generating a password from the passcode and token before receiving the password. Receiving the passcode and token separately would not constitute “receiving the password” since the individual passcode and token components are not the claimed “password.”

...

The written description supports this construction. In the alternative embodiment, the written description never refers to separate reception of the passcode and token as receiving the password. ’658 patent at 4:59–61 (“In an al- ternative embodiment, the passcode 154 and the token 156 are submitted separately.”). The written description also repeatedly juxtaposes the password with the passcode and token components . . . We see no error in the district court’s construction of “receiving the password” to preclude separate reception of the passcode and token."

"The Board’s finding “that one device in a ‘better position’ than the other devices [to handle a subsequent user query] then exits its low power mode and ‘wakes up’ so it can respond to any subsequent user query” is unsupported by substantial evidence because it assumes a causal relationship between two steps Rosenberger discloses as independent alternatives . . . Sonos argues we may nevertheless affirm under its alternative theory that Rosenberger anticipates the challenged claims because Rosenberger’s devices remain in a low power mode other than Rosenberger’s self-described, low power “listening” mode during coordination . . . It is undisputed, however, that the Board made no fact findings regarding this alternative “low power mode” theory in its FWDs . . . We decline to make fact findings regarding this alternative theory in the first instance and leave this issue for the Board to consider on remand."

"Dr. Appel explained how ovens, fluid beds, and coating pans were capable of handling hundreds of kilograms of tablets at a time and were also common pieces of equipment found in drug manufacturing facilities. Dr. Appel further explained why a coating pan would have been an especially attractive piece of heating equipment, as it allowed large scale curing, followed by coating, and thus a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been especially motivated to use a coating pan to cure Bartholomäus’s PEO tablets at scale to maximize manufacturing efficiency."

"Here, the remedy Ms. Hafeman seeks, and its relationship to institution, eliminates any doubt that § 314(d) bars our review. Ms. Hafeman argues the Board “should have terminated the IPRs in light of the Sotera violation, or at minimum, addressed why the IPRs should proceed in the FWDs” . . . And she requests that we vacate the Board’s final written decisions and “remand with instructions to dismiss” the IPRs. . . . The problem with Ms. Hafeman’s challenge is that it seeks to terminate the IPRs for reasons related to the institution decision because the Sotera stipulation was a consideration for institution. This makes clear that her challenge “has institution as its direct, immediate, express subject” and is thus beyond our review . . . This is not a situation where our review of termination is unrelated to the institution decision . . . "

"Did ecobee prove by clear and convincing evidence that the limitations of the asserted claims of the ’495 Patent, when taken individually or when taken as an ordered combination, involve only technology which a person of ordinary skill in the art would have considered to be well-understood, routine, and conventional as of April 9, 2004? "

"However, neither the district court’s Alice step two verdict form nor the related jury instructions informed the jury that the ’495 patent’s claims were directed to an abstract idea, much less specified what that abstract idea was. Nor did they instruct the jury that the abstract idea itself could not supply the inventive concept under Alice step two . . . Similarly, the district court’s instructions did not include any identification of or reference to the abstract idea, instead noting only that step one “is one for the Court to decide and not the jury” . . . the district court’s instruction was inconsistent with this Court’s precedent. This Court has explained that “[a]fter identifying an ineligible concept at step one, we ask at step two ‘[w]hat else is there in the claims before us?’” . . . Consistent with that principle, this Court’s precedent evaluates the alleged inventive concept at step two in light of the abstract idea identified at step one . . . None of the cases cited by Ollnova permit consideration of step two without first identifying7 an abstract idea at step one."