"We conclude . . . that the KNL defendants have, at a minimum, shown that there is a substantial question regarding whether the accused door can satisfy a claim limitation requiring a panel that is “flexible along [its] entire length” . . . We see nothing in the specification or prosecution history suggesting that the claim language does not mean what it says when it requires a “second outermost surface” which is “form[ed]” from “foam insulating material . . . during prosecution Cold Chain . . . stated that “[t]he sandwich structures of Rauenbusch are not the same as [the] claimed structure” because “the Rauenbusch sandwich structures do not include a foam insulating material forming the second outermost surface of the door.” We likewise conclude that there is a substantial question regarding whether the accused door is an “insulated overhead door” . . . as that term is used in claim 1."

"[W]hile Ridge alleged that it had been forced to sell its doors at reduced prices because of the alleged infringement by the KNL defendants, it failed to show that there was any causal nexus between sales of the accused doors and the prices Ridge set for its own doors . . . . We conclude, moreover, that the district court erred in determining that injunctive relief was merited based upon the Ridge plaintiffs’ assertions that: (1) TTPS incorrectly stated that the accused door was patented when it instead was the subject of a pending patent application; and (2) Kirk interfered with Ridge’s business relationships by sending a letter to Whiting Door threatening royalty damages."

"1. A method for treating gefitinib and/or erlotinib resistant non-small cell lung cancer in a patient in need thereof, comprising administering daily to the patient having gefitinib and/or erlotinib resistant non-small cell lung cancer a pharmaceutical composition comprising a unit dosage of an irreversible epidermal growth factor receptor (EGFR) inhibitor that covalently binds to cysteine 773 residue in the ligand-binding pocket of EGFR or cysteine 805 residue in the ligand-binding pocket of erb-B2." (emphasis added)

"Wyeth argues that the district court erred in granting JMOL because, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Wyeth, a reasonable jury could have concluded that AstraZeneca failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the asserted claims require undue experimentation to determine a non-toxic or non-fatal unit dosage for daily administration to a patient. "

"[T]he specification leaves the determination of the claimed “unit dosage” entirely to the knowledge of the skilled artisan . . .While the knowledge of one of ordinary skill may play an important role in enablement, it may not provide the only means to enable these specific claim limitations . . . That is what a specification of a patent must provide." (emphasis added)

"We recognize that it is accepted practice in patent law for one to be able to claim a method of treatment disclosing a range of doses to be administered, without showing actual clinical data, and leaving it to the FDA to ensure that approved products are safe and effective . . . The problem with these patents is that, perhaps because of close prior art, their claims are limited to dosage forms to be administered to patients, yet they disclosed only a broad range of doses some of which were shown to be toxic, and they disclosed no actual dosages for any compound within the scope of the claims, thereby leaving it to a practitioner of the claims to perform undue experimentation." (emphasis added)

"1. A method for assessing the shape of an orthodontic aligner, said method comprising the following steps: a) more than 1 week after the start of the treatment with the aligner, acquisition of at least one image at least partially representing the aligner in a service position in which it is worn by a patient, called “analysis image”, the analysis image being a photograph, or an image extracted from a film; b) analysis of the analysis image by means of a deep learning device, trained by means of a learning base, so as to determine a value for at least one tooth attribute of an “analysis tooth zone” representing, at least partially, a tooth on said analysis image, the tooth attribute relating to a separation between the tooth represented by the analysis tooth zone, and the aligner represented on the analysis image, in the step a), a cellphone is used to acquire the analysis image." (emphasis added)

"Furthermore, while claim 14 of the ’248 patent and claim 7 of the ’409 patent require that the “deep learning device” be trained in a specific manner ––i.e., on a “learning base” comprising more than a thousand images of dental arches, see ’248 pat., col. 34 ll. 21–33; ’409 pat., col. 33 ll. 12–17––that does not mean they provide a specific technological solution that would render the claims patent-eligible. That a “deep learning device” be trained on a specific subset of data is “incident to the very nature of machine learning,” and thus is not a “technological improvement” rendering the claims eligible under § 101."

"[N]othing in claim 14 requires a specific quantitative assessment beyond the ability of an orthodontist . . . At most, the claimed methods may perform such determination of the amplitude of separation with greater efficiency or speed due to the nature of the generic “deep learning device.” But that does not render the claims patent-eligible . . . The showdown claims fare no better at step two, as there is no “inventive concept” sufficient to transform the ineligible abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter. As stated previously, the “deep learning device” from each claim is conventional; the patents themselves explain that the device can be chosen from a list of well-known and available neural networks . . . Dental Monitoring next argues that using “deep learning devices” to guide orthodontic treatment was not “conventional” at the time the patent issued . . . But that misses the mark because “the relevant inquiry is not whether the claimed invention as a whole is unconventional or non-routine” . . . Rather, we look for an “inventive concept” that “transforms the claims into something ‘significantly more’” than the abstract idea . . . To the extent that Dental Monitoring considers the “deep learning device” to be “something significantly more” so as to render the claims patent-eligible, that argument is unavailing given that the patents themselves confirm that the “deep learning device” is generic."

"Linfo and Trustpilot’s Agreement triggers a jurisdictional inquiry for this court because, if the Agreement ended the controversy between the parties, we must dismiss this case as moot . . . Section 2.1 of the Agreement grants Trustpilot a “worldwide and irrevocable license” to “make . . . use, offer for sale, [and] sell” products or services covered by the ’428 patent “[s]ubject to [Trustpilot’s] payment of the Settlement Fee” . . . The Agreement also notes that if the Southern District of New York lawsuit “resumes in any manner, or the Federal Circuit . . . remands [this] case to the District Court, [Linfo] . . . shall file a Stipulated Dismissal with Prejudice . . . Altogether, the Agreement demonstrates that Trustpilot no longer has a stake in the outcome of this litigation"

. . . wherein said mobile computing device software comprises executable program code configured to facilitate annotation of a portion of said synchronization index responsive to user input received by the mobile computing device . . .

. . . said mobile computing device software comprises executable program code configured to synchronously play said associated multimedia with said synchronization index other than as part of a web page."

"Whether the non-function term (here, “executable program code”) identifies sufficient structure has two aspects that are of particular importance for the present case. First: We have often asked whether the non-function term would be understood by relevant artisans to name something identified by structural (not just functional) properties at all (a necessary predicate to being a structure that suffices for the claimed function(s)) . . . Second: Not just extra-patent usage in the field on its own, but, consistent with the importance of context to claim construction generally, the claim language may suffice to make clear whether certain claim words name sufficient structure in the understanding of the relevant artisan." . . .

. . . The function-operation distinction warrants particular attention in the software context, which is at issue here, because a non-functional term referring to code “is partly defined by its function . . .

. . . On remand, the focus of the § 112(f) analysis should be on whether the disputed limitations, read in full and in context, recite enough structure to perform the claimed functions . . .

. . . The claim language that here requires the annotation, synchronous-play, and other functions to be carried out by the same “software” communicates that the code referred to must be capable of being implemented with code that performs the other claimed functions . . . The parties’ arguments to date have not been focused on whether the claims reveal structure for those precise functions . . .

. . . more attention must be paid to whether the “executable program code” limitations, for the functions stated above, were generally known in the art at the time of the invention as names for known code. ”