"1. A method for assessing the shape of an orthodontic aligner, said method comprising the following steps: a) more than 1 week after the start of the treatment with the aligner, acquisition of at least one image at least partially representing the aligner in a service position in which it is worn by a patient, called “analysis image”, the analysis image being a photograph, or an image extracted from a film; b) analysis of the analysis image by means of a deep learning device, trained by means of a learning base, so as to determine a value for at least one tooth attribute of an “analysis tooth zone” representing, at least partially, a tooth on said analysis image, the tooth attribute relating to a separation between the tooth represented by the analysis tooth zone, and the aligner represented on the analysis image, in the step a), a cellphone is used to acquire the analysis image." (emphasis added)

"Furthermore, while claim 14 of the ’248 patent and claim 7 of the ’409 patent require that the “deep learning device” be trained in a specific manner ––i.e., on a “learning base” comprising more than a thousand images of dental arches, see ’248 pat., col. 34 ll. 21–33; ’409 pat., col. 33 ll. 12–17––that does not mean they provide a specific technological solution that would render the claims patent-eligible. That a “deep learning device” be trained on a specific subset of data is “incident to the very nature of machine learning,” and thus is not a “technological improvement” rendering the claims eligible under § 101."

"[N]othing in claim 14 requires a specific quantitative assessment beyond the ability of an orthodontist . . . At most, the claimed methods may perform such determination of the amplitude of separation with greater efficiency or speed due to the nature of the generic “deep learning device.” But that does not render the claims patent-eligible . . . The showdown claims fare no better at step two, as there is no “inventive concept” sufficient to transform the ineligible abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter. As stated previously, the “deep learning device” from each claim is conventional; the patents themselves explain that the device can be chosen from a list of well-known and available neural networks . . . Dental Monitoring next argues that using “deep learning devices” to guide orthodontic treatment was not “conventional” at the time the patent issued . . . But that misses the mark because “the relevant inquiry is not whether the claimed invention as a whole is unconventional or non-routine” . . . Rather, we look for an “inventive concept” that “transforms the claims into something ‘significantly more’” than the abstract idea . . . To the extent that Dental Monitoring considers the “deep learning device” to be “something significantly more” so as to render the claims patent-eligible, that argument is unavailing given that the patents themselves confirm that the “deep learning device” is generic."

"Linfo and Trustpilot’s Agreement triggers a jurisdictional inquiry for this court because, if the Agreement ended the controversy between the parties, we must dismiss this case as moot . . . Section 2.1 of the Agreement grants Trustpilot a “worldwide and irrevocable license” to “make . . . use, offer for sale, [and] sell” products or services covered by the ’428 patent “[s]ubject to [Trustpilot’s] payment of the Settlement Fee” . . . The Agreement also notes that if the Southern District of New York lawsuit “resumes in any manner, or the Federal Circuit . . . remands [this] case to the District Court, [Linfo] . . . shall file a Stipulated Dismissal with Prejudice . . . Altogether, the Agreement demonstrates that Trustpilot no longer has a stake in the outcome of this litigation"

. . . wherein said mobile computing device software comprises executable program code configured to facilitate annotation of a portion of said synchronization index responsive to user input received by the mobile computing device . . .

. . . said mobile computing device software comprises executable program code configured to synchronously play said associated multimedia with said synchronization index other than as part of a web page."

"Whether the non-function term (here, “executable program code”) identifies sufficient structure has two aspects that are of particular importance for the present case. First: We have often asked whether the non-function term would be understood by relevant artisans to name something identified by structural (not just functional) properties at all (a necessary predicate to being a structure that suffices for the claimed function(s)) . . . Second: Not just extra-patent usage in the field on its own, but, consistent with the importance of context to claim construction generally, the claim language may suffice to make clear whether certain claim words name sufficient structure in the understanding of the relevant artisan." . . .

. . . The function-operation distinction warrants particular attention in the software context, which is at issue here, because a non-functional term referring to code “is partly defined by its function . . .

. . . On remand, the focus of the § 112(f) analysis should be on whether the disputed limitations, read in full and in context, recite enough structure to perform the claimed functions . . .

. . . The claim language that here requires the annotation, synchronous-play, and other functions to be carried out by the same “software” communicates that the code referred to must be capable of being implemented with code that performs the other claimed functions . . . The parties’ arguments to date have not been focused on whether the claims reveal structure for those precise functions . . .

. . . more attention must be paid to whether the “executable program code” limitations, for the functions stated above, were generally known in the art at the time of the invention as names for known code. ”

"Based principally on the guidance provided by the specification, we find Otsuka’s proposed claim construction more persuasive than the construction offered by Hetero. We construe the terms “dextromethorphan” and “quinidine” in the ’282 patent, including their use in the weightto-weight ratio of claim 1, to refer to the form in which those compounds are administered. Applying that construction, we hold that the district court did not err in finding that Otsuka was likely to succeed in proving that Hetero infringed the ’282 patent."

"While at first blush it is appealing to construe the terms “dextromethorphan” and “quinidine” to refer only to the free base forms of those compounds, a close analysis of the claims and specification of the ’282 patent leads us to construe those terms as referring to the compounds whether in free base or salt form."

"The majority’s construction, which calculates the weight-to-weight ratio either using the weight of the active moiety (when administered in the pure “free base” form) or the total weight of a salt compound (when administered in the salt form), is inconsistent with the objective of the invention and is unsupported by the specification and prosecution history . . . The purpose of the invention claimed in the ’282 patent is thus to decrease the blood level of quinidine while maintaining a therapeutically effective blood level of dextromethorphan in a patient that is receiving this treatment . . . Nothing in the intrinsic record indicates that administering quinidine or dextromethorphan in the form of a salt (as opposed to the free base form) has any therapeutic effect related to the efficacy of the combination or that it affects the blood levels of dextromethorphan and quinidine . . . Because, under the correct claim construction, Hetero has raised a substantial question of noninfringement, I would reverse the preliminary injunction."

"The district court granted Pfizer’s motion, concluding that the “C2” in —NHC(O)—C2-C12-alkyl of the ’048 provisional was not an obvious typographical error that it had the power to correct, and therefore the change from — NHC(O)—C2-C12-alkyl in the ’048 provisional to — NHC(O)—C1-C12-alkyl in the ’953 patent impermissibly broadened the scope of the patent such that the ’953 patent was not entitled to priority from the ’048 provisional . . . Here . . . the dispute is whether there is adequate written description support in the ’048 provisional’s disclosure of —NHC(O)— C2-C12-alkyl for the ’953 patent’s disclosure of —NHC(O)— C1-alkyl. That is, whether “2” provides adequate written description support for “1” . . . We conclude that the ’048 provisional does not convey to a skilled artisan that the inventors possessed — NHC(O)—C1-alkyl at the time of the ’048 provisional’s filing date. The ’048 provisional and the ’953 patent recite two different ranges of chemical moieties. The former recites —NHC(O)—C2-C12-alkyl and the latter recites — NHC(O)—C1-C12-alkyl. C2 is simply different from C1, and the ’048 provisional’s disclosure of a range of C2 to C12 provides no support for the ’953 patent’s disclosure of C1 because the ’048 application explicitly includes an alkyl group with two to twelve carbon atoms (i.e., —NHC(O)—C2-C12- alkyl), and notably does not include an alkyl group with one carbon atom (i.e., —NHC(O)—C1-alkyl) . . . , “[e]ntitlement to a filing date . . . extends only to that which is disclosed,” Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1571–72, and —NHC(O)—C1-alkyl was simply not disclosed in the ’048 provisional."