"First, we construe “transmitting electric . . . signals over air” in claim 1 to mean transmitting signals over air in electric form—something neither party disputes is scientifically impossible . . . Satius argues that “transmitting electric . . . signals over air” is not scientifically impossible because, properly construed, this language refers “to the fact that the electric signal [transmitted within the device] will be transformed into an electromagnetic signal, and then that electromagnetic signal is what will go out over the air and to its destination” . . . We do not agree. Transmitting signals over the air is not the same as transmitting signals to the air . . . We conclude the claims are invalid for lack of enablement because, to comply with 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)’s enablement requirement, “the specification must enable the full scope of the invention as defined by its claims” . . . This standard cannot possibly be met when, as here, the claims include an express limitation that adds inoperable (and thus non-enabled) alternative embodiments to the scope of the invention."

• Here's the patent.
• Compare: PAVO SOLUTIONS LLC v. KINGSTON TECHNOLOGY COMPANY, INC. ("changing "case" to "cover" where the latter was intended")
• Compare: CANATEX COMPLETION SOLUTIONS, INC. v. WELLMATICS, LLC ("[T]here is only one correction that is reasonable given the intrinsic evidence")

"[claim 1’s preamble does not refer] to transforming an electric signal to an electromagnetic signal that is then transmitted over air because this would require rewriting claim 1 to provide for an electricto-electromagnetic transformation step that (1) does not exist in the claim language and (2) would not apply equally to claim 1’s “electric . . . signals” and “electromagnetic signals.”"

"There were a number of strong indicators prior to the filing of the suit at issue that the asserted claims were invalid under § 101. First, the Supreme Court decided Alice . . . Second, the PTO determined claims in two of the three related applications were patentably indistinct from independent claims of the ’317 patent . . . and rejected claims in all three related applications under § 101 post-Alice . . . Third, and again post-Alice, the court in Fusion Skill held claims of the related ’315 patent ineligible under § 101. In such circumstances, it does not suffice for Epic Tech or its counsel to rely only on the presumption of validity when faced with multiple indicators that these claims were unpatentable under § 101 . . . The court failed to address whether Alice put Epic Tech on notice of its asserted claims’ potential invalidity . . . The court also failed to adequately address whether the PTO’s office actions served as notice of potential invalidity . . . The court’s analysis regarding the Fusion Skill holding likewise fails to provide reviewable reasoning for the court’s decision."

"In SRI International, we held claims non-abstract that were directed to a “specific technique” for “using a plurality of network monitors that each analyze specific types of data on the network and integrating reports from the monitors” to solve the “technological problem” of “identifying hackers or potential intruders into the network” . . . In Finjan, we held that, although scanning for computer viruses by itself is an abstract idea, the claims were nonetheless non-abstract because they included limitations corresponding to a “behavior-based” approach to virus scanning which “constitutes an improvement in computer functionality” . . . And in McRO, we held claims focused on an improvement in computer animation non-abstract for setting forth specific rules for, e.g., “evaluat[ing] sub-sequences, generat[ing] transition parameters or apply[ing] transition parameters to create a final morph weight set” . . . Ultimately, our determinations in those cases rested on the recitation of specific solutions for solving technological problems in the respective claims. We cannot say the same is true here.

As the district court determined, nothing in the claims or specification indicates any specific technological improvements or solutions to an internet-centric problem in advertising. Instead, the Asserted Patents are directed to combining two methods of conventional targeted internet advertising, i.e., using either page context or user browsing history to select advertisements . . . And the performance score concept is directed to the non-technological problem of selecting the highest revenue generating advertisement." (my emphasis)

"[a] claimed unconventional combination [that] improves the functioning and operation of the computer itself by performing parallel computations in a faster amount of time."

". . . that its construction of “independently calculate,” which was originally proffered by Berkeley, did not require parallel processing of calculations but would allow for sequential calculations or no calculations at all . . . (“[A]lthough the patented invention describes performing the independent calculations simultaneously in an embodiment, there is no necessity to do so, and no such limitation is recited. The claims intentionally provide direction to perform the independent calculations simultaneously, sequentially, or if necessary, not perform some of them at all.")."

"[T]he district court determined that claim 1 of the ’521 patent is directed to an abstract idea of “calculating profitability” . . . We agree . . . This claim is directed to the idea of performing mathematical calculations to determine profitability using a computer to do so. The idea of performing calculations based on “abstract processes of collecting and analyzing information, without more,” is an abstract idea."

"Here, the parties and the district court agree that the alleged inventive concept of parallel processing is not required by the claim such that a system that does not perform calculations in parallel could still fall within the scope of the claim . . . Thus, it was legal error for the district court to nonetheless conclude that parallel processing supplied the inventive concept for claim 1 of the ’521 patent."

"[T]he district court made two relevant findings: (1) plaintiffs pursued objectively baseless infringement positions as to each patent, and (2) plaintiffs litigated in an unreasonable manner" - CAFC affirms as to (1) so doesn't address (2) - "Claim 12 requires “growing single-crystal diamond . . . on the growth surface . . . [t]he district court thus concluded that plaintiffs “put forth no evidence whatsoever that contradicted [the images from Nouveau] or otherwise demonstrated infringement." )